NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2009, Volume 24 by , ,
NBER 2009 Macro Annual – Paper 6  
Beaudry, Lucke, Letting Different Views About Business Cycles Compete 
 
Bernd Lucke initiated the discussion with several brief responses to the 
discussants. He agreed with Jonas Fisher that different measures of technology, such as 
the measure in Basu, Fernald and Kimball (2006), are desirable. He showed that results 
using that technology measure show the same pattern for hours as the benchmark TFP 
results. Fisher had also discussed the lack of robustness when allowing two vs. three 
cointegrating vectors and the challenges of using the Johansen methodology to test for 
the number of cointegrating vectors. Lucke agreed that there may be size problems with 
the test. As an alternative, he pointed to the results obtained when estimating a VAR in 
levels, which will be a consistent estimator of any cointegrating vectors that may be in 
the system. With this approach, one does not need to specify a certain number of 
cointegrating vectors and does not use any structural analysis, but rather do a Cholesky 
decomposition of the reduced form errors. Lucke showed that these results also pointed to 
the big importance of anticipated vs. surprise shocks.    
John Fernald commented that structural VAR long run restrictions have some 
well-known limitations and unknown sensitivities. In terms of limitations, he highlighted 
the paper by Erceg, Guerrieri and Gust (2005), which does a Monte Carlo simulation of 
data from New Keynesian and RBC models. The statistic that those authors find least 
reliable is the variance decomposition. In their simulations, the 90% confidence interval 
for the contribution of technology shocks to output fluctuations at business cycle 
frequencies ranges from 7 to 90 percent. He also pointed out that results are sensitive to 
low frequency properties of the data, as Fisher had pointed out in his discussion. In light 
of these challenges, the next step, in his view, is to turn to alternative identification 
schemes, such as the one pursued in the paper by Basu, Fernald and Kimball (2006). That 
paper found that technology shocks explained a lot of the variation in employment, 
though not much variation in output. It also found no evidence that stock prices or 
consumption Granger-caused TFP shocks. In updated work (Basu, Fernald, Fisher and 
Kimball, 2009), which extends the sample and breaks it into investment and consumption 
shocks, Fernald finds that investment technology shocks are incredibly contractionary for 
hours, output, and investment, while consumption technology shocks are expansionary. 
However, there is no evidence of Granger causality from stock prices to those shocks. 
Fernald offered that there is some weak evidence in the quarterly utilization-adjusted TFP 
series, but the explanatory power is low. All this evidence seems to suggest that there 
simply is not a lot of news in the stock market about technology innovations. Lucke noted 
that he would further investigate why the results of Fernald and his co-authors differ from 
the results of the present paper.  
Jennifer La’O wondered why the qualitative properties of the anticipated TFP 
shocks identified by Eric Sims (2009) differ from the properties shown here. Specifically, 
she recalled that Sims finds that investment goes down in response to an anticipated TFP 
shock. Lucke noted that Sims looks for all structural shocks that are orthogonal to TFP 
shocks and seeks the linear combination of these shocks that best explains future TFP. He 
found this approach problematic because there is no penalty associated with increasing 
the number of variables in the system. Using Sims’ methodology on simulated data which 
consists only of independent random walks and no news shocks, Lucke found that the approach nevertheless identifies a news shock, whose importance becomes larger and 
larger as one increases the dimension of the system.  
Marc Giannoni was intrigued by the authors’ finding that there is a permanent 
effect of monetary shocks on hours. He wondered if that result reflects an omitted 
variable problem, since there are monetary shocks in the system, but no account for 
inflation. He noted that in the investment specific shock literature, accounting for 
inflation becomes important once one adds a news shock. Lucke pointed out that the non-
neutrality result arose in the case of two cointegrating vectors, which is why the authors 
moved away from this specification. The benchmark case with three cointegrating vectors 
does not have permanent effects of monetary shocks.  
Simon Gilchrist agreed with Fisher’s discussion that time to build seems 
incredibly important in a framework that seeks to identify news shocks. He also found 
very compelling the evidence in Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2009) on the link 
between financial market imperfections and shocks that affect the transformation of 
consumption into investment goods. In his own work with Egon Zakrajsek (2007), he 
found that the primary determinant of investment spending from 1973 onwards is the 
corporate credit spread. When thinking about news shocks and the mechanism through 
which they might create business cycle fluctuations, Gilchrist thought that it is also 
interesting to think about the interaction of such shocks with the financial markets. In the 
model of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), adding a news shock would yield a big 
shock to the net worth of the investment sector, which would cause an immediate 
investment boom. This mechanism raises questions about the identification of news 
shocks.  
Chris Carroll followed up by stressing that he finds it very difficult to believe that 
financial shocks are something that we can still ignore in thinking about macroeconomic 
fluctuations. He pointed out that the only interpretation of financial market shocks that 
exists in this paper is the movement in stock prices, which is seen to reflect perfectly 
rational knowledge of future changes in knowable technology. He thought that this 
approach has to change, since it is not a credible description of how the macroeconomy 
fluctuates. He echoed Ken Rogoff’s comment in the discussion of the paper by Angeletos 
and La’O that it is difficult to understand business cycles without thinking about financial 
influences. He noted the connection even in the less dramatic downturns, such as the 
1990s recession, widely believed to have something to do with the credit crunch, the 
2001 recession, following the tech bubble, and, of course, our current circumstances. He 
seconded Gilchrist that economists need a serious way to model interactions between 
financial markets imperfections and the apparatus currently used to think about 
fluctuations.  
Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe recalled Cochrane’s 1994 paper, which failed to find a 
significant role for credit frictions in generating business cycle fluctuations between 
World War II and 1994. She agreed that these frictions are particularly important in the 
current crisis, but she wondered if this automatically implies that they are also extremely 
important for the regular “up-and-down” fluctuations at cyclicalities between six and 30 
quarters. Lucke added that the shock identified as a news shock in the paper may very 
well include financial market news, since the only assumption is that it is orthogonal to 
TFP. However, he pointed out that this shock contributes to TFP but not to the nominal 
interest rate, which suggests that perhaps financial market conditions do not play a very significant role at business cycle frequencies. In response, Carroll cited the paper by 
Gilchrist, Yankov and Zakrajsek (2009), which constructs measures of risk spreads from 
the bond market and finds that this variable has vastly more predictive power over a long 
span of macroeconomic history than pretty much anything else.  
Gilchrist concluded with a call to arms: just as Fernald and his co-authors are 
improving our measures of technology, we should significantly improve measurements of 
the information content of asset prices. He noted that his research shows very clearly that 
corporate bond spreads are one of the most informative pieces of information available, 
especially for investment spending, and we should understand why that is the case.  